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We analyze the advantages of centralization and decentralization in industries in 
which production takes place in several stages and the costs are privately observed 
by the agents in charge of production. We demonstrate that "informational dis-
economies" arise when uncorrelated information is concentrated in the hands of a 
single agent. These diseconomies arise when the stages of production are different 
activities with different cost supports. Journal of Economic Literature Classification 
Numbers: D82, L22, L51. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The organization of production is especially important in industries like 
the electric power industry, where production takes place in several stages 
(distribution, transmission, and generation), and/or the final good is com-
posed of several components. In such industries, a single firm may be respon-
sible for the different stages or components. Alternatively, multiple firms may 
operate, each undertaking a different activity. We will refer to the former 
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la Fuente, Xavier Freixas, Hugo Hopenhayn, Ines Macho-Stadler, Chelo Pazo, J. David Perez-
Castrillo, Pierre Picard, and Pau Olivella. Comments by an anonymous referee have substan-
tially improved the paper. Financial support from Ministerio de Educaci6n y Ciencia, DGICYT 
Grant PB97-0550-C02-01 for the first author and DGICYT, under Project BP96-0118, for the 
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possibility as "centralized structure," and to the latter as "decentralized struc-
ture." This paper studies the optimal organization of production when the 
costs of its different stages are uncorrelated private information, observable 
only by those who undertake it. 
When costs are correlated across activities, the principal may find it 
optimal to choose a decentralized structure and rely on relative performance 
schemes to lower the cost of the contract. Demski and Sappington [5,6J 
have shown that whenever it is possible to divide production into similar 
activities whose costs are correlated, it is better to decentralize production. 
Dana [3 J establishes that informational economies of scope arise when one 
firm produces both goods. The regulator should weigh these economies 
against the benefits of relative performance schemes. 
If costs are uncorrelated, the centralized structure enables the regulator to 
avoid the informational externalities that would arise with multiple inde-
pendent firms. This argument is similar to those used in a moral hazard 
framework suggesting that the formation of teams tends to increase welfare 
by eliminating risk and commitment externalities.2 In this vain, Baron and 
Besanko [2 J and Gilbert and Riordan [7 J have shown that the optimal 
regulation of complementary products may involve a centralized structure? 
For this to be the case the support of the cost distributions in the different 
stages of production must be symmetric. 
Our main contribution in this paper is to provide a theoretical basis for 
the choice of a decentralized structure when costs are uncorrelated and the 
products are complementary. More specifically, we show that when the sup-
ports of the cost distributions in the different stages of production are suf-
ficiently different, activities are optimally separated. With different supports, 
two different effects arise under centralized production. The first effect favors 
centralization: the cost of the contracts is reduced when agents internalize 
the externalities that arise in decentralized structures. The second effect 
favors decentralization: when production is centralized, the firm obtains 
greater informational rent because of its ability to coordinate messages. That 
is, centralization increases the size of the agents' message space, and this 
generates new informational rents. This effect, which we will call Concentra-
tion Effect, increases the cost of the contract. We will show that under the 
assumption of equal cost supports, the concentration effect does not arise 
but under more general circumstances it may even prevail. 
2 See Itoh [8J and Macho-Stadler and Perez-Castrillo [9]. On hierarchies and collusion 
among agents see Tirole [12]. 
3 Baron and Besanko, [2J also study informational delegation or subcontracting. Given strict 
complementarities between the two suppliers, they find that decentralized and delegated 
contracting can be perfonnance equivalent. Melumad et al. [IOJ have shown that delegated 
contracting may be inferior, in the absence of complementarities. 
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The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the model 
and characterizes the optimal contract under each structure. Section 3 com-
pares the two structures. Finally, Section 4 concludes. 
2. THE MODEL 
We will consider a good which is produced in two stages (i= 1, 2) (or is 
assembled from two components). Production can be undertaken separately 
by different agents, or jointly by a single one. We will assume a constant 
marginal cost at each stage of production, 8i. Hence, the total cost of q units 
of output is given by C( q, 81, 82 ) = (81 + 82 ) q. 
Cost realizations at each stage are independently distributed over two-
point supports. Formally, 8iE{8L8~}, with A8i=8~-8~>O, Vi=1,2. 
The probability of the low cost realization, y, is common to both activities 
and public knowledge. We allow the supports of the cost distributions to be 
different. Without loss of generality, we will assume that A81 ~ A82. 4 
The principal chooses the way in which production is to be organized. In 
particular, he contracts production out to either a single agent or to several, 
each of which is put in charge of a different activity. 5 We will refer to the 
first situation as centralization, and to the second as decentralization. In both 
cases, the principal designs contracts so as to maximize his net expected 
payoff W, which is the expected value of the difference between an increasing 
and concave function of output V(q) and the expected payments to the 
agent.6 Both the principal and the agents are risk neutral. 
2.1. Decentralization 
Under decentralization, the marginal cost of each producer is private 
information, and the principal induces truthful revelation in a Bayesian Nash 
equilibrium. That is, he designs a menu of contracts, {TI( {P, (p), T2( {)I, ()2), 
q( {)I, (}2)} specifying the payments to each agent and the required output 
level as a function of announced costs, ({)i, ()-i). We will write qjk to denote 
the required output when {)I = 8J and {)2 = 8J, where j, k E {L, H}. The 
4 A possible interpretation is that the realization of the marginal costs for each of the stages 
may be the sum of an expected cost common to all of them, [j defined by yO~ + ( I - y) Ok = 
EOi = [j, Vi = I, 2, plus the realization of a random variable Si, which captures the specific effects 
which affect each stage of production, and whose impact on the marginal cost can be different 
in each stage. Formally, Oi = [j + Si, ei E { - wi, wi } Vi = I, 2, where w'? w2. 
5 In contrast to our model, in Riordan and Sappington [11] the principal can choose 
between undertaking second stage production himself or contracting out the second stage 
production to the agent who performs the first stage. 
6 V(q) can be interpreted as the consumer's surplus, if we think of the principal as a 
benevolent regulator, or as a firm's revenues. 
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optimal contract maXlmlzes the principal's expected payoff subject to 
appropriate incentive compatibility and participation constraints. We will 
require the "participation" constraint to hold ex post. One possible inter-
pretation which seems realistic in a regulation context is that firms have 
limited liability. 
It is easy to show that if the monotonicity constraint on the expected 
production levels holds, the principal will ensure that the ex post participa-
tion constraints for the less efficient agents and the incentive compatibility 
constraints for the more efficient agents hold with equality. A low cost agent 
will always participate if a high cost type does (for he can always sign the 
other type's contract and obtain a payoff above the reservation level). On the 
other hand, given that the low-cost agents expected output is no lower than 
that of the high cost agents, the latter do not find it attractive to pose as low 
cost types. Hence, optimal contracts satisfy: 
y(TlL - BlqLL) + (1 - y)(TlH- BlqLH) 
= y(nfL - BlqHL) + (1- y)(T1H- BlqHH), 
y(TiL - BiqLL) + (1- y)(T1L - BiqHL) 
= y(TiH- BiqLH) + (1- y)(T1H- BiqHH)' 
T1k- B1qHk=0, 
r;H - B1qjH = 0, 
for all k E { L, H}, 
for all j E {LH} 
Using equations above, we compute the informational rents earned by each 
agent in each state. Substituting the informational rents in the principal's 
objective function, the decentralized optimal contract satisfies 
V'(qHL) = B1+ Bi + -y- AB! 
l-y 
V'(q ) = B! + B2 + -y- [AB! + AB2] HH H H l-y . 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
As is usually the case in adverse selection problems, the principal distorts the 
choice of output levels by high-cost types in order to reduce the informa-
tional rents accruing to low cost agents. Moreover, only low cost agents earn 
positive informational rents. 
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2.2. Centralization 
Under centralization, a single agent simultaneously observes the realiza-
tion of the costs at both stages of production. It is straightforward to prove 
that the principal must base contracts on the sum of the cost of the two 
activities, 7 given by e = (81 + 82 ), in 
The principal designs a menu of contracts, {Te, qe}, specifying the payment 
to the firm and the required output level as a function of announced 
costs, e. 
To characterize the optimal contract, we begin by observing that the 
global incentive constraints are equivalent to 
THL -eHLqHL~ TLH-eHLqLH 
THL -eHLqHL~ THH-eHLqHH 
together with the mono tonicity restriction on output levels8 
qLL~ qLH~ qHL~ qHH' 
(5) 
(6) 
(7) 
(8) 
(9) 
(l0) 
Note that if (5), (7), and (9) are binding then (6), (8), and (10) also hold 
since q LL ~ q LH ~ q HL ~ q HH' Given the binding constraints, we can write 
TLL - eLHqLL = TLH - eLHqLH+ ,182(qLH- qLL) 
TLH - eHLqLH= T HL - e HLqHL + [,181 - ,182](qHL - qLH) 
THL -eHHqHL= THH-eHHqHH+,182(qHH-qHL)' 
7 Notice that for any pair of contracts (T((}I, (p), q((}I, (p)) and (T(()I, ( 2 ), q(()I, ( 2 )) such that 
01 + O2 = (}I + (p, the incentive compatibility contraints imply T(OI,(P) = TU)I, ( 2 ) and 
q( 01, (p) = q( {jI, {Plo Whenever .dOl> .d02, the principal's information is the same no matter he 
receives announcements about the combined marginal cost, 19, or about the marginal cost at 
each stage, (01, ( 2 ). 
8 As in the case of decentralization, the assumption on the size of the supports determines the 
ordering of the output levels. Had we assumed .d02 > .dOl, then the monotonicity condition 
would be written qLL>qHL> qLH> qHH' 
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Finally, if the participation constraint for the agent with high costs in both 
stages of production holds with equality, the informational rents accruing to 
any other agent are given by 
IILL =iJ02qLH+ IILH 
IILH = [iJ01 -iJ02 ] qHL +IIHL 
IIHL = iJ02qHH+ IIHH 
IIHH=[J,,=,O. 
The principal's problem is therefore equivalent to 
pC,,=, 
+y(l-y)[V(qHL)-@HLqHL] 
+(l_y)2 [V(qHH)-@HHqHH] 
- y2 iJ02qLH - y[ iJ01 - iJ02] q HL - (I - (l - y)2) iJ02q HH 
{qLL~qLH s.t. qLH~ qHL 
qHL~qHH' 
In the absence of distortions on the production level of the agent with low 
costs in both stages of production, qLL will always be larger than qLH' We 
can therefore ignore the first constraint and then check that the solution of 
the resulting problem does indeed satisfy it. This procedure will not work for 
the remaining (monotonicity) constraints. However, the incentive com-
patibility constraints qLH ~ q HL and q HL ~ q HH are never simultaneously 
binding. This allows us to reduce the number of possible cases to three. Next 
lemma establishes the three possible regimes and the ranking between them. 
LEMMA. Which regime prevails in each case depends on the relationship 
between iJ01 and iJ02. In particular, the solution to the principal's problem 
yields 
Regime I (q LL > q LH = q HL > q HH) if 
2 
iJ02 ~ iJ01 ~ -- iJ02 
'" "'2-y 
2 2-y 
Regime Il (qLL > qLH> qHL > qHH) if -- iJ02 < iJ01 < -- ,d02 2-y l-y 
2-y 
Regime III (qLL> qLH> qHL =qHH) if -- ,d02 ~ iJ0 1• l-y 
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Proof See the Appendix. I 
The intuition behind this result is the following. In adverse selection 
problems, the principal distorts the choice of output levels (or sets inefficient 
output levels) in order to reduce informational rents. The larger the marginal 
informational cost associated with a level of output, the larger is the optimal 
distortion from the point of view of the principal. When L18 l is not "very dif-
ferent" from .182 (regime I), the marginal rents associated with qLH are larger 
than those associated with q HL- Hence, the principal would like to distort 
qLH more than the incentive constraints allow him to. Hence, the principal 
"bunches" the production levels associated with the states "LH" and "HL." 
In regime Ill, the principal cannot distort q HL as much as he would like and, 
in order for the contracts to satisfy the incentive restrictions, the constraint 
q HL - q HH ~ ° must be binding. 
3. CENTRALIZA nON VERSUS DECENTRALIZA nON 
Baron and Besanko [2J and Gilbert and Riordan [7J have shown that 
when the supports of the cost distributions are identical the principal prefers 
to centralize production because he finds it less costly to induce honest 
revelation when a single agent has all the information. We now show that 
the assumption of identical supports is far from innocuous. 
PROPOSITION. If L18 l < (1/1 - y) .182 the principal strictly prefers to 
centralize production, but if L18 l > (1/1 - y) .182 he strictly prefers to 
decentralize production. When L18 l = (1/1 - y) .182, centralization and 
decentralization are equivalent. 
Proof For any value q == (qHH, qHL' qLH, qLL)' the expected rents under 
decentralization (EIlD) and under centralization (EIlC), are given by 
EIlD(q) = y2(L182qLH+ L18 l qHL) + y(l- y)[L18 l + L182J qHH, 
EIlC(q) = y2L182qLH+ y[L18 l - L182 J qHL + (1 - (1 - y)2) L182qHH' 
Hence, the difference in rents across structure types is equal to 
Denoting by qS to the optimal output under the structure of production S, 
S= C, D, optimality of output choices and (11) imply WC(qC) ~ WC(qD) > 
WD(qD) if 
EIlD(qD) - EIlC(qD) = y[L182 - (1- y) L18 l J(q~L - q~H) > 0, 
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Thus, 
(i) If Ll8 1 < (1/1 - y) Ll82, we have WC(qC) > WD(qD) since q~L > 
q~u-
(ii) If Ll81 > (1/1 - y) Ll82, then WD(qD) > WC(qC). To see this, notice 
that if Ll81 E (( 1/1 - y) Ll82, (2 - y/l - y) Ll(2 ), we have nD( qC) _ n C( qC) = 
y[ (1- y) Ll81 - Ll82](q~L - q~H) > O. And if Ll81 ?: (2 - y/l - y) Ll82, 
nD(qC) =nC(qC) due to q~L =q~H' and q~L =l=q~H imply WD(qD) > 
WC(qC). 
Finally, it is straightforward to see that Ll81 = (1/1 - y) Ll82, implies 
nD(q) = nC(q) for all q, and, consequently, WC(qC) = WD(qD). I 
Each structure has advantages and disadvantages when it comes to 
extracting information. To see this, let nj~ and nJl- denote the infor-
mational rents associated with (8j, 8~), j, k E {L, H}, under centralization 
and decentralization, respectively, where nJl- = Li~ I, 2 nJf:. We can write 
nfL =nfL -Ll82(qHL -qHH) 
nfH= nfH+ [Ll81 - Ll82 ] (qHL - qHH) 
n~L=nflL 
n~H=n~U-
Note that the centralization of production has two different effects: 
• Efficiency Effect. The informational rents associated with the state 
"LL" are smaller when production is centralized, i.e., nfL < nfL' The 
reason is that with decentralized production each agent does not take into 
account the fact that when he announces high costs, he reduces the infor-
mational rents accruing to the other agent (when the latter's costs are low). 
When production is centralized, agents internalize that externality and the 
expected cost of the contract is lowered by y2L182(qHL-qHH)' 
• Concentration Effect. The informational rents associated with state 
"LH" are larger when production is centralized, nfH> nfu- The reason is 
that centralization increases the set of possible announcements, and this 
increases the cost of inducing honest revelation. If we decentralized produc-
tion, the set of possible announcements becomes smaller, and informational 
rents shrink (the expected cost of the contract falls by y(1 - y)[ Ll81 - Ll82 ] 
(qHL -qHH))' 
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Hence, if AO l < (1/1 - y) A02, the efficiency effect prevails over the con-
centration effect and it is better to centralize production. In particular, 
when AO l = A02 there is no concentration effect and therefore centralization 
always dominates. When AO l = (1/1 - y) A02 both effects offset each other 
and therefore centralization and decentralization are equally efficient. 
Finally, if AOl > (l/l-y) A02, it is better to decentralize production. Note 
that decentralization is now the optimal choice even when the cost of the 
optimal contract is the same for both structures since decentralization 
allows the principal to loose the incentive constraints he faces. 9 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper we have analyzed the advantages of centralization and 
decentralization in industries in which production takes place in several 
stages (or the final good is compose of several components) and the costs 
at each stage are uncorrelated private information. 
Our main contribution has been to identify the existence of "informa-
tional diseconomies" associated with the concentration of information in 
the hands of a single agent. Centralizing production generates two different 
effects on the cost of the contracts: it makes for the internalization of infor-
mational externalities (efficiency effect), but it enables the coordination of 
the announcements of both costs (concentration effect). When the supports 
of the cost distributions are sufficiently different, the second effect 
dominates the first, thus the principal is better off when he decentralizes. In 
De Frutos and Da Rocha [4] it is shown that this insight generalizes when 
more general discrete distributions are considered. 1O In particular, it is 
shown that, allowing the probability of obtaining the low cost realization 
to vary across the two stages of production does not alter the preference for 
decentralized production. 
Organizational structure is particularly important in regulated industries 
like electric utilities. In this line, when Dana Jr. [3] concludes that 
regulators must centralize production when costs are sufficiently correlated, 
he writes " ... the break-up of electric utilities along distribution, transmission, 
and generation lines would be inconsistent with the theory." This paper 
9 When ,101 ~ (2 - y/I - y) ,1IP both contracts are equally costly but the principal prefers to 
decentralize since it gives him a larger margin of choice: under decentralization contracts must 
satisfy q HL ~ q HH, whereas under centralization the only allocations which can be implemented 
are those for which q HL = q HH' 
10 The interested reader will also find there an example for the continuous case for which 
decentralization is the optimal regulator'S choice. The crucial feature of that example is that the 
distribution function of OI(FI((JI)) stochastically dominates the distribution function of 
IP(F2(1P)). 
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provides theoretical support for the separation of electricity generation 
from its distribution and commercialization even when costs are un-
correlated, a practice which has been adopted in a number of countries. 
This choice may be seen as an attempt to reduce the informational advan-
tages derived from the concentration of all the relevant information in the 
hands of a single firm. 
APPENDIX 
Given that we can ignore the first constraint, qLL ~ qLH' the optimal 
contract satisfies 
(12) 
( 13) 
where /11 is the multiplier associated with q LH - q HL ~ 0 and /12 that of 
qHL-qHH~O. 
First we will show that the incentive compatibility constraints q LH-
q HL ~ 0 and q HL - q HH ~ 0 are never simultaneously binding. Suppose the 
contrary, i.e. let q LH = q HL = q HH = q and therefore /11 ~ 0 and /12 ~ O. By 
adding (13) and (14), and from (15), it is easy to see that we must have 
(2y - l/y) Lle2 ~ Lle l ~ (2/y(1 - y)) Lle2, which is impossible since 2/y(1-
y) > 2y - l/y. Hence, there are only three possible regimes. In order to com-
pare them, we will write qRk to denote the optimal quantity in regime R, 
J , 
R = I, Il, Ill, when the cost announcement is ejb with j, k E { L, H}. 
• Regime!. /11>0,/12=0 (qLH=qHV qHL>qHH), 
V'(q~L) = eLL 
V'(q~H) = V'(q~L) = e LH + 2(21 __ yy) Lle l -Lle2 
'( I 1 - (I - y? e2 
v qHH) = e HH + (1- y)2 Ll . 
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• Regime 11. f1, =f12 = 0 (qLH> qHL' qHL > qHH), 
V'(qII ) - e + -y- Ll02 LH - LH l-y 
V'(q~L) = e HL + -1_1- [LlO' - Ll02] 
-y 
, II 1-(l-y)2 2 
V(qHH)=e HH + (l_y)2 LlO. 
• Regime Ill. f1,=O, f12>O (qLH>qHL, qHL=qHH), 
V'(qIII) - e +-y- Ll02 LH- LH l-y 
Notice that we have V'(qLL) < V'(qLH) in all regimes. Observe too that 
the solution corresponding to regime 11 is at least as efficient as those for 
other regimes, since it corresponds to a free maximum of the objective 
function. Moreover, 
1 2 , 
(1 2[(2-y)LlO -(l-y)LlO]. -y) 
Thus, if LlO'E((2/2-y) Ll02, (2-y/l-y)Ll02) then 
V'(q~L) - V'(qfH) > 0 
V'(q~H) - V'(q~L) > 0 
implies qfH > q~v 
implies q~L > q~H' 
and the optimal solution to the principal's problem yields qfL > qfH > 
q~L >q~H' 
If LlO' ~ (2/2 - y) Ll02, or if LlO' ~ (2 - y/l - y) Ll02, the regulator must 
choose between regimes I and Ill. To see which regime prevails, notice that 
from a comparison of the first order conditions corresponding to these 
regimes, we obtain: 
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(1) For all L102 and L10 1, we have q~L=qff and q~L>q~~. 
(2) If L101 ~ (2/2 - y) L102, then q~H~ qf~ and q~H< qIf!H" 
(3) If L102 ~ (2 - y/I - y) L102, then q~H< qf~ and q~H ~ qIf!H" 
Consider first (2). The concavity of V(q) implies 
WC(qI) _ WC(qIII) 
~ y( 1- y)[ V'(q~H) - eLHJ(q~H- qf~) 
+ y( 1- y)[ V'(q~L) - e HLJ(q~L - qIJfrJ 
+ (I - y)2 [e HL - V'(q~H)J(q~k- q~H) - y2L102(q~H- qf~) 
- y[L101 - L102J(qkL - q~~) + (1- (1 - yf) L102(qIf!H- qkH)' 
Since q~H = q~L and qf~ > q~L straightforward computations yield 
WC(qI) _ WC(qIII) 
~lYL102_Y(2;Y) L10 1j [qf~-q~H+q~L-q~D, 
implying that regime I prevails over regime III since both expressions 
between brackets are non-negative. 
Finally if(3) holds, i.e., if L101~(2-y/l-y)L102, then it is easy to see, 
by using arguments similar to those in the previous case, that regime III 
dominates regime 1. 
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